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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
CRUDE OIL PRICE CONTROLS
EDWARD W. ERICKSON,* WILLIAM L. PETERS,**
ROBERT M. SPANN*** and PAUL J. TESE****

INTRODUCTION

Price controls on United States crude oil production and petroleum products are commonly thought of as a unique reaction to the
unprecedented increase in the world price of oil associated with the
events surrounding the Arab oil embargo. This view is in part true,
but it overlooks an important fact: the basic structure of the price
controls which are now in force for the U.S. petroleum industry was
largely in place and functioning prior to the embargo. The effect of
the changes in the price structure of the world oil market, which
were being translated into increased U.S. crude oil and oil product
prices, was to cause a special set of price controls to be developed
and continued for the U.S. petroleum industry.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONTROLS

Price controls were imposed on a substantial portion of the U.S.
economy during the period August 15, 1971 to April 30, 1974.1
Until March 6, 1973, the petroleum industry operated under the
same general regulations that applied to manufacturing and re-selling
industries.2 Since this date, the petroleum industry has been subject
*Professor of Economics and Business, North Carolina State University.
**Consultant, Washington, D.C.
***Associate Professor of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.
****Graduate student, NCSU.
The authors are indebted for conversations with Mark J. Frederiksen. All errors remain
their own.
1. For a more detailed description of the administrative development of petroleum price
controls, see OFFICE OF ECONOMIC STABILIZATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, History of Petroleum Price Controls, Historical Working Papers of the Economic
Stabilization Program, Part II 1227-1340 (Washington: GPO) (hereafter cited as History).
2. The specific phases of the general price controls were:
Phase I:
August 15 to November 12, 1971.
Initial 90 day freeze on wages and prices.
Phase II:
November 12, 1971 to January 10, 1973.
Mandatory cost pass-through controls.
Phase III:
January 11 to June 12, 1973.
General price standards applied on voluntary and selfadministered basis.
Freeze II:
June 13 to August 12, 1973.
60 day price freeze.
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to special regulations imposed in response to the higher levels of
price increases which were occurring in this industry. General price
controls on the other sectors of the economy expired on April 30,
1974.
Prior to 1973, petroleum was not viewed as a special inflationary
problem. One of the curious, but not surprising, things about the
narrative description in History is the continued identification of a
change in relative prices for a particular industry with the general
problem of inflation. For example: "So, as Phase II neared its close
at the beginning of 1973 and the administration was preparing to
relax inflation controls, the first of a long series of oil price problems
was emerging as a major inflationary threat."' The initial 90 day
price freeze (Phase I) limited prices in all sectors of the economy to
their August 15, 1971 levels. Under Phase I, gasoline prices were
frozen at their seasonal (summer) high, and distillates were frozen at
seasonally low prices.
The Phase II regulations allowed for price increases above August
15, 1971 levels only to the extent that they reflected cost increases.
In most instances, large companies were required to give the Price
Commission advance notice of price increases and to specify cost
increase information.4 Further, companies were constrained by a
profit-margin limitation; the limit being defined as the highest profit
rates (as a percent of sales) from two of the last three fiscal years
prior to August 15, 1971.
After January 10, 1973, the Phase III program of "General StanAugust 13, 1973 to April 30, 1974.
Mandatory price regulations re-imposed.
See, History, at iii for a more complete chronology. In addition, there was also a special
two-week freeze (October 15-31, 1973) for petroleum products which was used for collecting and analyzing comments on proposed rulemaking to amend the Phase IV petroleum
regulations. See, History, at 1286-1287.
3. History, at 1238. See also 1245, 1250, 1261, 1263, 1279, 1281, 1285, 1305, and
1308. World and U.S. oil prices have recently been quite stable in nominal terms and
declining in real terms, but the general rate of inflation has accelerated due to overall
monetary and fiscal phenomena.
4. Most major oil companies opted for term-limit pricing (TLP) agreements. These limited company price increases to a weighted average of 2 percent per year. The TLP agreements were subject to both cost justification provisions and profit margin limitations. TLP
agreements allowed companies to allocate cost increases between product lines so long as
the weighted average cost increase was below 2 percent. However, over the course of the
year this did not allow petroleum companies enough flexibility to adjust the price of
distillates to seasonally higher prices during the 1972-1973 heating season and still remain
within the average 2 percent increase. The price controls thus tended to aggravate the
heating oil shortage that winter. Independent retailers and wholesalers generally were free
from controls after the adoption of the Small Business Exemption on May 6, 1972. Most
small crude oil producers were also exempt, though crude prices remained stable throughout
1972.
Phase IV:
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dards" for price adjustments applied "voluntarily and on a selfadministered basis" was substituted for Phase II mandatory price
controls. In the face of less restrictive controls, distillate prices increased sharply after the beginning of Phase 1II. In February, 1973,
the Cost of Living Council held public hearings on heating oil price
increases. As a result, in March the Council issued Special Rule No. 1
which reimposed mandatory controls on the sale of crude and petroleum products. This rule covered the twenty-four largest petroleum
firms.' Under the rule, price increases of more than 1 percent above
January 11, 1973 prices had to be cost justified; increases of more
than 1.5 percent were subject to profit margin limitations and prenotification.
In response to the general inflationary pressures during the first
half of the year, an economy-wide 60 day price freeze was declared
on June 13, 1973. After this second freeze, most sectors of the
economy were under general Phase IV price controls. As in Phase III,
the petroleum industry was subject to more stringent consideration.
In August and September of 1973, controls were imposed on all
segments of the petroleum industry, from wellhead to retail pump
price. Basically, refiners and re-sellers could increase prices above
base levels only to the extent that they reflected increased crude and
purchased product costs on a dollar-for-dollar basis. For refiners,
base prices were those of May 15, 1973. Crude oil prices were frozen
at their May 15, 1973 prices plus 35 cents per barrel. 6 The distinction between "old" oil and uncontrolled "new" oil was implemented
at this time.
Initially, Phase IV re-sellers and retailer margins were limited to
January 10, 1973 levels. This was intended to roll back dealer margins from their higher May, 1973 levels. On September 28, 1973, the
dealer margin levels were changed to those in effect on May 15,
1973. The regulations that were in effect just before the October,
1973 Arab oil embargo were designed to limit price increases to a
5. The premise was that since the 24 largest firms accounted for 95 percent of output,
their regulation would effectively control the entire industry. This reasoning failed since
these companies did not have full penetration at every level of the industry. For example,
only 10 percent of retail gasoline stations were direct company operations. This anomaly
created a dual market, with most supplies from refiners sold at controlled prices, while most
retailers were uncontrolled. From January to June 1973, retail prices of gasoline and distillates (measured by the Consumer Price Index) increased 7.3 percent and 10.6 percent,
respectively. For more on Special Rule No. I and the dual market, see History, at
1242-1250.
6. In December, 1973, in anticipation of the end of the crude oil price controls in 1974,
an additional one dollar increment over the May 15, 1973 base price was added to the
allowed price for old oil. This adjustment produced the $5.25 per barrel figure which is now
widely regarded as the general ceiling price for old oil.
See History, at 1308-1310.
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dollar-for-dollar pass-through of increased crude and imported product costs.

There has recently been discussion of the relationship between
U.S. and world product prices and the effects of decontrol of U.S.
crude oil and product prices. This is a question to which we will
subsequently return. There is little doubt, however, that the price
controllers of the Energy Division of the Cost of Living Council
perceived the regulatory apparatus as a device to encourage increased
imports. As the architect of the system recounts in History: "What
finally emerged was a system designed to keep prices in line with
costs, while at the same time encouraging greater domestic production and not discouraging importation of necessary additional petroleum supplies;" 7 or "To encourage the importation of the necessary
petroleum products in this country, refiners had to be permitted to
recoup the higher costs of these increases by raising their prices for
refined products;" 8 and "The other advantage was that the cost
pass-through system allowed purchasers of incremental product to
compete in the world market and yet essentially made certain that
they would not reap large windfall profits as a consequence." 9 These
1973 regulations serve as the nucleus of continued petroleum price
regulations. They are the basis for the multitier controls on crude oil
which are now in effect. 1 0
Petroleum price controls originated under the more general price
control apparatus of the Economic Stabilization Act.' ' In addition,
on November 27, 1973, Congress passed the Emergency Petroleum
Allocation Act of 1973 (EPAA).' 2 During December of 1973, petroleum price control and allocation responsibilities were transferred
from the Energy Division of the Cost of Living Council to the Federal Energy Office. 1 3 The EPAA extended petroleum price regula7. See History, at 1264.
8. See History, at 1292.
9. See History, at 1313.
10. The various pricing categories of oil now in force or proposed include old oil (lower
tier), new oil (upper tier), stripper oil, Alaskan North Slope oil, Naval Petroleum Reserve oil,
enhanced recovery oil and "new new" oil. Stripper oil is oil produced from wells which for
technical and economic reasons have been unable to produce more than 10 barrels per day.
For a time, there was also a category of released oil which provided special incentives for
increased oil production from old oil properties. In the discussion which follows, released oil
is not considered. For more on released oil, see, ERICKSON, MILLSAPS, & SPANN, Forecasting U.S. Crude Oil Supply under Alternative Tax and Regulatory Regimes, (Proceedings
of the Conference on the Economics of Oil and Gas Self-Sufficiency in Canada, University
of Calgary, Alberta, Canada) 33-36 (1975); W. MONTGOMERY, The Transition to Uncontrolled Crude Oil Prices, Social Science Working Paper No. 186, California Institute of
Technology 28-31 (1977); and History, at 1265 and 1306.
11. Pub. L. No. 92-210, 85 Stat. 743 (1971).
12. Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87 Stat. 627 (1973).
13. See History, at 1318-1320.
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tion and allocation authority until August 30, 1975. After repeated
efforts to fashion workable allocation procedures, the "entitlements
system" was proposed in late 1974 and implemented in early

1975."4 In December of 1975, the Energy Policy and Conservation
Act (EPCA)' ' solidified the system of price and allocation regulations into their approximate present form. The provisions of EPCA
provided for controls to be gradually phased out over the period
from February, 1976 through May, 1979. In August of 1976, the
Energy Conservation and Production Act (ECPA)' 6 provided for the
decontrol of stripper oil.
AN ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR
MULTITIER CRUDE OIL PRICE CONTROLS

Crude oil price controls are a political phenomenon with a life of
their own. But there is an economic rationale for multitier crude oil
price controls based upon the concept of regulatory monopsonization of U.S. crude oil producers. 1 If one assumes that the elasticities of supply of crude oil from different categories of production
differ, and if one assumes that an element of the objective function
which guides U.S. energy policy formulation is to minimize the outlays of U.S. oil consumers (or revenues of U.S. oil producers) for any

given volume of U.S. crude oil production, 1 8 then a stylized representation of a multitiered crude oil price control system for domestic

production can be readily constructed.
In Figure 1, only three sources of crude oil are considered: lower
tier domestic oil, upper tier domestic oil and imported oil. It is
assumed that the elasticity of supply of lower tier (old) domestic oil
is lower than that of upper tier (new) domestic oil, which in turn is

lower than that of imported oil. For purposes of illustration, it is
further assumed that the United States is a price taker in the world
14. For more detail on the history of the entitlements program, see W. Montgomery, A
Case Study of the Regulatory Programs of the Federal Energy Administration, Social Science Working Paper No. 147, California Institute of Technology (1977).
15. 42 U.S.C. §6201 (1975).
16. 42 U.S.C. §6801 (1976).
17. This example follows Mark J. Frederiksen, A Theory of Multi-Tiered Price Regulations and Its Application to Domestic Crude Oil Production (mimeo presented at the Western Economic Association meetings, June, 1978).
18. See History, at 1303; MONTGOMERY, No. 186, supra note 12, at 33-40; and
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ENERGY POLICY AND PLANNING, THE
NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN (Washington: GPO, 1977). The most succinct statement of
this rationale is that of The National Energy Plan: "Deregulation of oil and gas prices would
make U.S. producers the beneficiaries of those arbitrary price rises, and yield windfall
profits from the increased value of oil and gas in existing fields. The producers have no
equitable claim to the enhanced value because it is unrelated to their activities or economic
contributions." Id. at 50.
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FIGURE 1
A MONOPSONY PRICING RATIONALE FOR
DOMESTIC CRUDE OIL PRICE CONTROLS
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Q
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New
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oil market and faces a perfectly elastic supply of imported oil.'
Under these conditions, the objective of minimizing consumer outlays for U.S. oil is met if the controlled prices for categories of U.S.
19. In addition, locational and quality differences among various types of crude oil are
ignored. Quality differentials include such varying features of specific crude oils as specific
gravity and sulphur, asphaltene, wax, heavy metal content, etc. All of these features cause
crude oil to be less than fungible for a particular refinery installation. The most important
heterogeneity currently may be sulphur content.
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crude oil production are set such that the marginal factor cost of
each source is equal to the price of imported oil. A discriminatory,
multitier price control system for U.S. crude oil production thus
reduces the outlay for domestic crude oil, but increases the demand
for imported oil.
For such a system to be efficient in a static sense, the controllers
must know the elasticities of supply of the various categories of
domestic oil; the actual set of controlled prices must reflect these
elasticities; there must be no interaction between the volume of U.S.
imports of oil and the world oil price; the reduced outlays of consumers must be valued more highly than the foregone revenues of
domestic producers; there must be no adverse strategic national security implications of increased reliance on imported oil, and the prices
which consumers pay must reflect the marginal cost of imported oil.
Alternatively, if increased producer revenues are politically assigned zero social value, and if there are adverse strategic national
security consequences of increased oil imports, then for static efficiency to be achieved, the cost of insuring against such implications
must be less than the benefits derived by consumers due to discriminatory reduction of outlays for domestic oil. On the other hand, if
national security insurance is not costless, and if no social value
judgment is made concerning consumer outlays and producer revenues, then a crude oil price control system which reduces domestic
output and increases imports must have negative net benefits.
The dynamic efficiency conditions are more complicated."0 In
addition to efficient consumption and national security considerations, they include short-run and long-run production effects. The
long-run production considerations for conventional crude oil involve
the extent of the domestic resource base and the time path of its
development and use. The shorter-run production considerations
involve the effects of the price control system upon the rates at
which the supply curves for the various categories of established oil
production drift to the left as reservoirs are depleted and secondary
and enhanced recovery project opportunities are foregone. 2" The
knowledge requirements for the design and administration of even a
statically efficient price control system are formidable.
20. See, MONTGOMERY, supra note 12, at 41-60.
21. This effect, as well as the rate at which new oil prospects are acquired and drilled,
may not be independent of the cash flows of producing firms if the cost of capital for
internally generated funds is less than that for external funds. See, ENERGY ECONOMICS
DIVISION, CORPORATE BANKING DEPARTMENT, CHASE MANHATTAN BANK,
THE IMPACT OF CONTINUED PRICE CONTROLS AND THE CRUDE OIL EQUALIZATION TAX (COET) ON THE IMPORTED OIL REQUIREMENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES (1978).
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The knowledge requirements for a dynamically efficient system
are even more perplexing. This is because the ultimate extent of the
domestic conventional' 2 crude oil resource base can only be inferred
in very general terms from a priori geological information. The actual
extent of the ultimate resource base can only be determined from
the results of drilling and recovery investment projects. Since a price
control system reduces drilling and investment incentives, it also
reduces the rate at which that knowledge is acquired which is an
essential input into the design of the system. 2 3 In the final analysis,
the question is one of whether regulatory direction and the power to
tax or private initiative and market incentives are the best guides for
optimal oil resource development and transition to alternative
sources of energy.
THE PRICE OF OLD OIL

The current average price of old oil is in the neighborhood of
$5.30 per barrel. 2 4 There is a widespread presumption that the volume of old oil output is insensitive to the old oil price. 2" This
presumption is based upon too simplistic a conception of crude oil
production. Crude oil production does not simply involve drilling
wells, setting casing, installing surface facilities, turning a valve, and
allowing the reservoir to produce until it is depleted. Crude oil is
often corrosive. The prbduction process involves the production of
fine sand grains, in addition to the oil, from the underground rock
formation in which the oil occurs. Formations must be fractured or
leached with acid to maintain producibility. Reservoir pressure must
be maintained by injecting fluids. Pumps must be installed. Wells
must be worked over as they become corroded or clogged. The density of well spacing may be increased to improve ultimate recovery or
to shift production from the future to the present. Some of these
expenditures are ordinary maintenance included in the lifting costs
of oil production. Others are investment expenditures with payouts
which stretch over the remaining life of the reservoir. Lower old oil
prices increase the decline rate of established production. In this
22. Conventional crude oil is here used to include the output of enhanced oil recovery
projects. Shale oil, tarsands oil and other sources which are based upon essentially mining
rather than drilling technology are excluded.
23. In addition, the nature of reservoir engineering is such that some opportunities may
be completely foregone rather than just postponed.
24. In February, 1978, the old oil price was $5.29 per barrel. See, U.S. ENERGY
DEPARTMENT, ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, MONTHLY ENERGY
REV. 73, DOE/EIA-0035/5 (May 1978).
25. For example, ". . . [T] he static model implies that the lower tier price will be irrelevant to production decisions." MONTGOMERY, No. 186, supra note 12, at 32.
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connection it is worthwhile to examine how current lower tier price

incentives compare to historic incentives to undertake the costs of
such activities.
In Table 1, the economic incentive in the current old oil price of
approximately $5.30 per barrel in current collars is converted into
constant 1969-1970 dollars and compared to a reference price of
$3.30 per barrel.' 6 Under price controls, the real economic incentive
for maintaining the production of that oil we know the most aboutold oil-has declined by approximately a dollar per barrel (or about
25 to 33 percent). The long-term, cumulative effect of this erosion of
incentive has negative effects upon domestic crude oil supply. First,
there is a reduction in the number and type of maintenance and
increased ultimate recovery investments which can be cost justified.
The effect of price controls upon investment projects to increase
TABLE 1
DEFLATION OF THE ECONOMIC INCENTIVE IN THE OLD OIL PRICE
Current Old Oil Price
Deflation Factor*

$5.30
187.8

Deflated Old Oil Price

$2.82

Adjustment for Elimination of
Percentage Depletion
(.14 x $3.30)**

$0.46

Net Economic Incentive in
The Old Oil Price

$2.36

Percentage Reduction from
1969-1970 Price

28%

*March, 1978, WPI = 203.8 (1967 = 100) Average 1969-1970 WPI = 108.6
**See E. ERICKSON, S. MILLSAPS, and R. SPANN, OIL SUPPLY AND TAX INCENTIVES, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, 2:1974, at 449-478, for a
discussion of the depletion component of economic incentives for crude oil supply. The
adjustment used here is an approximation.
26. In 1969-1970, analysts used a representative price of $3.30 per barrel for low sulphur, high gravity crude oil at tidewater as a basis for examining U.S. oil policy. This price
included the economic incentive of percentage depletion at 27.5 percent. CABINET TASK
FORCE ON OIL IMPORT CONTROL, THE OIL IMPORT QUESTION 39 (Washington:
GPO, 1970). The actual average price of all U.S. crude oil was $3.09 per barrel in 1969 and
$3.18 in 1970. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, BASIC PETROLEUM FACT
BOOK, Section VI, Table 1. The wholesale price index (all items) is used as the deflator.
Since oil field equipment and supplies have generally increased in cost more rapidly than the
WPI, the deflated economic incentive inherent in the current old oil price is overstated. This
is offset somewhat by use of the $3.30 reference price.
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recovery can be quite complicated. If the project succeeds in increasing production above the Base Production Control Limit (BPCL), all
the oil in excess of the BPCL qualifies for upper tier prices. However,
if natural decline causes production subsequently to fall below the
BPCL, the price component of the economic incentive for investments to increase ultimate recovery reverts to the old oil price. The
lower tier price is less than half of the upper tier price. As a result,
this potential jeopardy inhibits investment decisions. 2 7 Second, as
the volume of old oil consequently declines more rapidly than would
otherwise be the case, a larger burden of meeting the composite price
stipulated by the controls is shofted to upper tier oil. 2 8 Since the
composite price is a weighted average of lower and upper tier oil
prices which is less than the upper tier price, a smaller volume of
lower tier oil necessarily reduces the upper tier price. The result,
under composite price controls, is to reduce the price incentive for
discovering and developing new oil resources.
COST PASS-THROUGH AND PRODUCT PRICES
U.S. crude oil price controls are intended to be reflected in lower
U.S. refined product prices. This intention has been embodied in
price controls on refined products. 2 9 Refiners have thus been subject
to two sets of price contraints: (1) the market constraint established
by competition among refiners, and (2) the controlled price based
upon cost pass-through regulation. In the event that controlled ceiling prices based upon cost pass-through exceed market prices, refiners are permitted to "bank" costs.3 0
27. A concrete example illustrates this effect. The SACROC unit for the Kelly-Snyder
field in Texas has installed a CO 2 injection system to increase recovery. It appears to be a
technical success. But production has now fallen below the BPCL and upper tier price
incentives have been withdrawn. At lower tier prices, the continued operation of the project
appears not to be economically feasible. SACROC is a bellwether project and its regulatory
experience will condition expectations for investment in other projects. The Department of
Energy is moving to allow uncontrolled prices for oil from enhanced recovery projects
beginning September 1, 1978. (Wall Street Journal, July 27, 1978, at 6) This step could
have been accomplished earlier under current law. A continuing question will be whether
the administration of the program is so narrowly interpreted that U.S. oil production which
would otherwise be feasible is foregone because of regulatory constraints.
28. In February, 1978, the imputed average price used for the purpose of price controls
was $8.48 per barrel. See MONTHLY ENERGY REV., supa note 24, at 73. This composite
price is less than the actual domestic average price ($8.84 in February, 1978) because of an
adjustment for stripper oil which limits the depressing effect upon the composite price
which exemption of stripper oil from price controls would otherwise have. Stripper oil has
been exempt from price controls since September 1, 1976. The February, 1978, upper tier
price was $11.81 per barrel.
29. Product price controls are gradually being removed. Middle distillates and residual oil
are now exempt from controls. There is a pending proposal to decontrol gasoline.
30. Banked costs accumulate for specific products, and there have been various arrange-
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Since the simple analytics of a price control system based upon
cost pass-through are very much like that of an excise tax (see Figure
2), it is not surprising to find that all of the crude oil cost increases
have not been passed through into increased refined product prices.
FIGURE 2
MARKET AND REGULATORY CONSTRAINTS FOR REFINED PRODUCTS

N.B.: AB
P0
P,
P2

= crude oil cost increase
= initial price
= new price
= cost pass-through based ceiling price

ments designed to limit or permit banked costs accumulated for one product to be used to
relax the regulatory price constraint for another product. These arrangements have changed
from time to time. Gasoline is now the product for which there is the most flexibility in
terms of using banked costs accumulated in other product sales to relax the controlled price
constraint.
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For refined products,
the market has generally been the more bind3
ing constraint. 1
THE U.S. AND THE WORLD MARKET

It has recently been argued that decontrol of U.S. crude oil prices
would have no effect upon U.S. refined product prices. 32 In short,
the argument is that world refined products are made from world
crude, and the U.S. imports refined products, therefore U.S. refined
product prices must reflect world crude prices. And because banked
costs indicate that U.S. product markets are clearing at less than the
allowable controlled ceiling prices, decontrol of U.S. crude oil prices
would not cause U.S. refined product prices to increase. Unfortunately the public policy issue of crude oil price decontrol cannot
be solved so simply.
The entitlements program subsidizes the importation of residual
oil into the U.S. East Coast. 3 3 Much of the refined product imported
into the United States is produced in refineries which have been built
in the Caribbean or Canada particularly to serve the U.S. market.
34
Much of this refining capacity has substantial excess capacity.
There is reason to believe, both analytically and empirically, that in
addition to monopsonizing U.S. crude oil production, U.S. crude oil
price controls have resulted in at least some temporary, modest
monopsonization of suppliers of refined products to the U.S. market. 3 s In 1977, the weighted average U.S. wholesale value of a component barrel of refined products did not greatly exceed the landed
cost of the barrel of crude oil from which they were refined. 3 6 This
31. In February, 1978, unrecouped costs for refined products for the 30 largest refiners
were $1.8 billion. In 1977, they averaged $1.5 billion. In E. ERICKSON, OIL, DIVESTITURE AND NATIONAL SECURITY (F. N. Trager, ed.) 61-4 (1977), it was argued that
firms with market power would not bank costs. Jim Sweeney and Bob Scott have each
shown in private communication that this statement is too strong. Under some combinations of price elasticity of demand and output elasticity of marginal cost, a firm with market
power would bank costs. But the general conclusion holds, a firm with market power is less
likely to bank costs than a firm in an effectively competitive industry.
32. See, C. PHELPS and R. SMITH, PETROLEUM REGULATION: THE FALSE
DILEMMA OF DECONTROL, RAND R-1951-RC (1977).
33. See COX & WRIGHT, The Effects of Crude Oil Price Controls, Entitlements and
Taxes on Refined Product Prices and Energy Independence, 54:1 Land Economics, 1-15
(February 1978).
34. John H. Lichtblau, Pricing U.S. Oil Products, Wall Street Journal, November 11,
1977, p. 16; and PIRINC, Distillate Fuel Oil in Mid-Winter: An Analysis of the Currentand
Near-Term Supply, Demand and Price Situation (1977).
35. See Martin J. Bailey, The Crude Oil Equalization Pass-Through Issue (mimeo, 1977),
for an analytical treatment of this question.
36. See Monthly Energy Rev., supra note 19, for the landed cost of imported crude oil
and the Oil and Gas J. for representative wholesale product prices. For example, in June of
1977, the refiner acquisition cost of imported crude averaged $14.63 per barrel and the
wholesale value of a barrel of refined products was slightly in excess of $16 per barrel.
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suggests that non-U.S. refiners' margins on product exports to the
U.S. were abnormally low. In the event of decontrol of U.S. crude oil
prices, U.S. crude oil prices would in general reflect world crude oil
prices, with locational and quality differentials. 3 At the current
level of world crude oil prices ($14 to $15 per barrel landed in the
U.S.), this would mean an increase in U.S. product prices of approximately five cents per gallon for gasoline.
THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION PROPOSALS
The EPCA crude oil price controls are scheduled to phase out in
May, 1979. The President, subject to veto by Congress, may extend
them for two additional years. However, to replace the system of
price controls and entitlements for crude oil, President Carter has
proposed a Crude Oil Equalization Tax (COET) and user taxes on oil
consumption. 3 8 This combination of policy instruments reflects the
conflict in goals which has characterized U.S. energy policy formation. On the one hand, reduced reliance upon imported oil is desired. 3 On the other hand, a regulatory system intended to limit the
profits of domestic oil production and subsidize oil use increases U.S.
dependence upon imported oil. 4" This conflict has not been limited
to the Carter Administration.
Rather than equalizing the U.S. price of crude oil and refined
products with world market crude oil prices, various conservation
measures such as automobile mileage standards, mandatory coal conversion, and the 55 mile per hour speed limit attempt to cause U.S.
refined product users to act as if they were facing shadow prices
which were at the world level (or higher), while at the same time
subsidizing direct prices through the crude oil price control system.
From an analytical point of view, the proposed COET and oil user
taxes represent a curious set of proposed additions to existing policy.
Most analysts agree that the elasticity of supply of crude oil exceeds
in absolute value the elasticity of demand for refined products.
Under these conditions, proposals which rely upon demand effects
37. In February, 1978, U.S. upper tier prices were $41.81 per barrel and uncontrolled
stripper prices were $13.90 per barrel. Old oil accounted for 40.74 percent of U.S. supply,
and has been a steadily declining fraction. Monthly Energy Rev., supra note 19, at 73-4.
38. The National Energy Plan, supra note 12, at xv, xvii, 35-40, 49-52, and 60-66. As of
this writing (summer of 1978) the Administration's energy proposals are making very slow
progress in Congress, and consideration of COET is likely to be deferred until 1979. The
user taxes on gasoline are no longer under active consideration.
39. See, The National Energy Plan, supra note 12, at 9.
40. See COX and WRIGHT, supra note 29, for an analysis which separates the effects for
product and crude oil markets. U.S. crude oil imports are about three times as great as
product imports. Total U.S. oil imports account for nearly half of U.S. consumption.
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for most of the desired adjustment, and which restrict the price of
domestic oil to less than the minimum opportunity cost of alternative supplies, 4 1 require substantially more tax and regulatory intervention in the economy than would a simpler policy which includes
continuation of the phased decontrol of oil prices proposed under
EPCA.
CONCLUSIONS
Direct crude oil and refined product price controls, allocations and
entitlements have been a complicated chapter in the complicated
regulatory history of the U.S. petroleum industry. The basic price
control system was in place prior to the embargo and, while controls
in the rest of the economy were being phased out, the embargo
resulted in an elaboration and continuation of controls in the U.S.
petroleum industry. The effect of U.S. crude oil price controls has
been to monopsonize U.S. crude oil producers, increase U.S. dependence upon imported oil, subsidize domestic consumption and perhaps monopsonize some refiners with non-U.S. capacity targeted to
the U.S. market. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975
provided for crude oil price controls to phase out in May of 1979.
Such a phase-out would simplify the regulatory environment in
which the U.S. petroleum industry operates, increase domestic supplies of oil and reduce reliance upon imports. The political question
which now appears to be on the agenda for the U.S. energy economy
is whether, and in what fashion, the crude oil price control phase-out
legislated in EPCA will be allowed to occur.

41. Under the proposals in The National Energy Plan, supra note 12, at 50-2, a new tier
of domestic oil production would be created. This "new new" oil would be allowed in 1980
to reach the nominal world market price which obtained in 1977, adjusted for domestic
inflation. Use of the landed cost of imported oil as the minimum opportunity cost of
alternative supplies does not include any national security premium.

